The FIR was numbered 60/2022 and dated 24 January 2022. It was registered for offences under Sections 323/354/34 IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act .

A witness statement recorded during the earlier proceedings had been noted as stating that no sexual assault had occurred on the date of the incident. This was a crucial factor suggesting that the allegations in the FIR may not have been accurate .

The parties entered into a comprehensive Settlement Agreement dated 14 July 2026, which resolved all outstanding issues between them .

The complainant personally appeared before the High Court and clearly stated that she did not wish to pursue the case. She was identified by her counsel and the Investigating Officer .

The State expressed no objection to the quashing of the present FIR, indicating that the prosecution did not perceive a strong public interest in continuing the proceedings .

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, provides: “Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” This provision preserves the inherent powers that were earlier available under Section 482 CrPC .

The Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab clarified: “Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable.” Compounding is governed by Section 320 CrPC and is limited to specified offences, while quashing under Section 528 BNSS is guided by whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power .

No. The Supreme Court has held that the power is “of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.” It is to be exercised sparingly and with caution .

Section 323 IPC concerns voluntarily causing hurt. The provision generally applies where a person voluntarily causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to another person. It is punishable with imprisonment up to one year or fine or both .

Section 354 IPC deals with assault or criminal force against a woman with the requisite intention or knowledge relating to outraging her modesty. It is punishable with imprisonment of not less than one year but which may extend to five years, and fine .

Section 34 IPC embodies the principle of joint liability where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of their common intention .

Section 8 of the POCSO Act prescribes punishment for sexual assault as defined under the Act. The provision is punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine .

No. Offences under the POCSO Act are not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC. They are treated as offences involving a substantial public interest and cannot ordinarily be disposed of merely through private compromise. However, the High Court can quash such proceedings in appropriate cases under its inherent powers .

The Supreme Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2014) 6 SCC 466 laid down the following principles : (1) Power under Section 482 is to be distinguished from compounding under Section 320; (2) The power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution; (3) The guiding factor is to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process; (4) Such power is not to be exercised in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity; (5) Criminal cases having predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or matrimonial relationships or family disputes, should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes .

The Supreme Court emphasized that the court must consider the nature and gravity of the offence. Offences that are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society are more amenable to quashing on settlement, while heinous offences cannot be quashed .

The Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 held: “The power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court” .

The key principle is that the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings, or whether continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer. If the answer is in the affirmative, the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings .

The Supreme Court held: “The criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.”

The POCSO Act was enacted with the specific intention of protecting children from sexual offences, recognising their vulnerability and ensuring their development in conditions of freedom and dignity. It is a special statute designed to provide a robust legal framework for the protection of children .

The Delhi High Court has recognised a distinction between a “de-juré victim” (a victim in law) and a “de facto victim” (a victim in reality). In consensual adolescent relationships under the POCSO framework, there may be situations where the law constructs a victim by reason of minority, even though in reality no harm has been suffered .

The Court observed that the predominant judicial trend favours quashing proceedings where the de-juré victim disclaims that she has suffered any loss or injury, especially in cases where parties have subsequently married, are cohabiting, and have children, on the ground that “continuing with trial in such cases would be an exercise in futility” .

The Delhi High Court has noted that consensual adolescent relationships under the POCSO framework may constitute “crime without a victim” where the lived experience of the parties reveals absence of injury or grievance. In such cases, the court may be inclined to quash proceedings .

In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court held that quashing of an FIR in cases of sexual assault solely on the basis of a compromise between the parties is invalid and warrants judicial interference .

The Supreme Court ruled that quashing proceedings initiated under the POCSO Act by the High Court is against the intention of the legislature behind its enactment which strives to protect children of tender age and their childhood or youth from getting exploited or abused .

The Delhi High Court in a separate ruling held that proceedings under the POCSO Act cannot be quashed based on a compromise between a child victim or the victim’s family and the accused. The Court observed that such offences are heinous and have a serious impact on society .

The views can be reconciled by recognising that the decision to quash POCSO proceedings is highly fact-sensitive. Where the allegations are serious and involve genuine harm to a child, quashing is generally not permissible. However, where the complainant disclaims any injury, the parties have genuinely resolved their disputes, and continuation of proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash .

After considering the cumulative circumstances, the High Court held that continuation of the criminal proceedings would not serve any useful purpose. The Court specifically observed: “In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the view that no useful purpose would be served by continuation of the criminal proceedings in respect of the said FIR.” This finding formed the immediate basis for exercising the Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS .

The Delhi High Court quashed: (1) FIR No. 60/2022 dated 24 January 2022; (2) the proceedings arising from the FIR; (3) offences under Sections 323/354/34 IPC; and (4) the offence under Section 8 of the POCSO Act .

Considering the nature of the charges, the petitioners were directed to pay ₹30,000 as costs to the Delhi High Court B.A. Costs Account. The amount was required to be paid within four weeks, with proof of payment to be placed on record. The parties were also directed to remain bound by the terms of the Settlement Agreement dated 14 July 2026 .

The ruling demonstrates that even for offences under special statutes like the POCSO Act, the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings where the facts and circumstances justify it. The court balanced the public interest in prosecuting sexual offences against the reality that continuation of proceedings would serve no useful purpose where the complainant disclaims injury and the parties have genuinely resolved their disputes .

The witness statement recording that no sexual assault had occurred on the date of the incident was a crucial factor suggesting that the allegations in the FIR may not have been accurate, thereby supporting the conclusion that continuation of proceedings would serve no useful purpose .

The complainant personally appeared before the High Court and stated that she did not wish to pursue the case. This was not a situation where a compromise was forced upon an unwilling victim. The voluntary nature of her statement was a strong factor in favor of quashing .

The comprehensive settlement between the parties resolved not just the present FIR but interconnected disputes, suggesting a genuine resolution rather than a coercive compromise. The existence of a broader settlement provided context and consistency .

The State expressed no objection to the quashing, indicating that the prosecution did not perceive a strong public interest in continuing the proceedings. While the State’s no-objection is not binding on the court, it is a significant factor .

The first step is to engage with the complainant, preferably through counsel, to reach a genuine settlement. The settlement should address the underlying dispute and should be recorded in writing. The petitioner should ensure that the settlement is voluntary and free from any coercion .

The parties should execute a Compromise Deed, Settlement Agreement, or Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) recording the terms of the settlement. This document should be signed by both parties and, if possible, witnessed. The agreement should clearly state that the parties have resolved their disputes and that the complainant has no objection to the quashing of the FIR .

The petitioner should file a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (or Section 482 CrPC, depending on the applicable law at the time), seeking quashing of the FIR and all proceedings emanating therefrom. The petition should be accompanied by the settlement agreement and an affidavit from the complainant supporting the quashing .

The complainant should appear before the court, either in person or through video conferencing, to confirm the settlement. The court will typically speak with the complainant to ensure that the settlement is voluntary and genuine. In the present case, the complainant appeared before the court and stated that she did not wish to pursue the case .

The court may direct the petitioner to deposit costs with the Delhi High Court B.A. Costs Account or the Delhi State Legal Services Authority as a condition for quashing. In the present case, the court directed the petitioners to pay ₹30,000 as costs .

Emphasize the nature and gravity of the offence. POCSO offences are treated as offences involving a substantial public interest and cannot ordinarily be disposed of merely through private compromise .

Argue that quashing proceedings under the POCSO Act on the basis of compromise is against the intention of the legislature behind its enactment which strives to protect children of tender age and their childhood or youth from getting exploited or abused .

Highlight the vulnerability of the child victim and the need to protect their interests. The POCSO Act was enacted specifically to protect children from sexual offences .

Distinguish the present case from rulings where quashing was permitted by pointing to factors such as the age of the victim, the nature of the allegations, and whether the settlement is genuine or coerced.

Insist that the court conduct a thorough inquiry into the genuineness of the settlement and the voluntariness of the complainant’s statement before exercising its inherent jurisdiction.

The consequences for the accused/petitioner include: (1) the FIR and all proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed; (2) the accused will not face trial or conviction for the offences alleged; (3) the criminal record is effectively cleared in respect of the quashed FIR; (4) the accused may be required to pay costs to the Delhi High Court B.A. Costs Account or the Delhi State Legal Services Authority; and (5) the accused is restored to the position he would have been in had the FIR not been registered .

The consequences for the complainant include: (1) the criminal proceedings come to an end; (2) the complainant cannot subsequently pursue the same criminal case; (3) the complainant may be bound by the terms of the settlement; and (4) if the settlement involved monetary consideration, the complainant may receive or have received such consideration .

No. Once an FIR is quashed by the High Court, it cannot be revived. The quashing is final and binding. However, if the quashing was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, the court may recall its order .

While quashing does not erase the fact that an FIR was registered, it effectively clears the accused of the offences alleged. The accused cannot be prosecuted for the same offences based on the quashed FIR. The accused can truthfully state that the FIR has been quashed by the High Court .

The court has discretion to impose costs as a condition for quashing. The costs are typically deposited with the Delhi High Court B.A. Costs Account or the Delhi State Legal Services Authority. The amount varies depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, the cost was ₹30,000 .

Compounding is governed by Section 320 CrPC and is limited to specified offences. Quashing under Section 528 BNSS (formerly Section 482 CrPC) is the inherent power of the High Court to quash any criminal proceeding, including non-compoundable offences, to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process .

The legal position is nuanced. While the Supreme Court has expressed caution regarding quashing POCSO offences on compromise, High Courts have exercised their inherent jurisdiction in appropriate cases where the facts justify it—particularly where the complainant disclaims any injury, the parties have genuinely resolved their disputes, and continuation of proceedings would serve no useful purpose .

The Delhi High Court quashed FIR No. 60/2022 and all proceedings arising from it, holding that no useful purpose would be served by continuation of the criminal proceedings. The Court imposed costs of ₹30,000 to be paid to the Delhi High Court B.A. Costs Account .

The Court considered: a witness statement indicating no sexual assault occurred; the comprehensive settlement between parties; the complainant’s personal appearance and statement that she did not wish to pursue the case; the quashing of connected FIRs; and the State’s no-objection to the quashing .

The Supreme Court laid down principles including: the power to quash is distinct from compounding; it must be exercised sparingly and with caution; it is not to be exercised in heinous offences like murder, rape, and dacoity; criminal cases with predominantly civil character should be quashed when parties have resolved their disputes; and the Court must examine whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak .

The witness statement recording that no sexual assault had occurred on the date of the incident was a crucial factor suggesting that the allegations in the FIR may not have been accurate, thereby supporting the conclusion that continuation of proceedings would serve no useful purpose .

The Court directed the petitioners to pay ₹30,000 as costs to the Delhi High Court B.A. Costs Account. Costs are often imposed in such matters to prevent frivolous settlements and to ensure that the court’s time is not wasted .

The Delhi High Court has recognised a distinction between a “de-juré victim” (a victim in law) and a “de facto victim” (a victim in reality). In consensual adolescent relationships under the POCSO framework, there may be situations where the law constructs a victim by reason of minority, even though in reality no harm has been suffered .

Yes, the State has the right to appeal against a quashing order. However, if the State has already given its no-objection to the quashing, it is less likely to appeal. The State’s no-objection is a significant factor but is not binding on the court .

The litigant should: (1) ensure a genuine settlement is reached; (2) obtain the complainant’s voluntary consent, preferably recorded before the Court; (3) execute a written settlement agreement; (4) file a petition under Section 528 BNSS; (5) ensure the complainant appears before the Court to confirm the settlement; and (6) be prepared for costs to be imposed .

The Supreme Court held that quashing of an FIR in cases of sexual assault solely on the basis of a compromise between the parties is invalid and warrants judicial interference. Quashing proceedings under the POCSO Act is against the intention of the legislature behind its enactment .

The views can be reconciled by recognising that the decision to quash POCSO proceedings is highly fact-sensitive. Where the allegations are serious and involve genuine harm to a child, quashing is generally not permissible. However, where the complainant disclaims any injury, the parties have genuinely resolved their disputes, and continuation of proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash .

The Delhi High Court has noted that consensual adolescent relationships under the POCSO framework may constitute “crime without a victim” where the lived experience of the parties reveals absence of injury or grievance. In such cases, the court may be inclined to quash proceedings .

Quashing effectively clears the accused of the offences alleged in the quashed FIR. The accused cannot be prosecuted for the same offences based on the quashed FIR. The accused can truthfully state that the FIR has been quashed by the High Court .

Yes, quashing can be sought at any stage of the proceedings, including after the chargesheet has been filed and the trial has commenced. The court’s power is not limited by the stage of the proceedings. However, the court may consider the stage of the proceedings in exercising its discretion .

The act of the High Court annulling or setting aside an FIR, complaint, or criminal proceeding, thereby bringing it to an end before or during trial .

The process by which a victim and offender settle a criminal case, governed by Section 320 CrPC, which lists the compoundable offences .

The powers of the High Court preserved under Section 528 BNSS (formerly Section 482 CrPC) to make orders necessary to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of the process of any court .

The offence of assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty. Punishable with imprisonment of 1 to 5 years and fine .

The offence of voluntarily causing hurt. Punishable with imprisonment up to 1 year or fine or both .

The principle of joint liability where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all .

The offence of sexual assault under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. Punishable with imprisonment of 3 to 5 years and fine .

A written agreement between parties recording the terms of their settlement of a dispute, which may be used to support a petition for quashing .

The leading Supreme Court decision on quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of settlement, distinguishing quashing from compounding .

A Supreme Court decision laying down principles for quashing on settlement, including that disputes of predominantly civil character should be quashed when parties have resolved their disputes .

The broader societal interest in ensuring that justice is done and that the legal system is not abused by frivolous or vexatious proceedings .

A victim in law—someone who is legally considered a victim by reason of minority, even if no actual harm has been suffered .

A victim in reality—someone who has actually suffered harm or injury .